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North Korea Has Become Critical to Russia’s War, Sending 14,000 Troops and Millions of Shells: North Korea has promised to support Russia until Moscow achieves victory in Ukraine, turning a relationship once denied by both governments into an openly declared military partnership. Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui made the pledge during a July 19 meeting with President Vladimir Putin, according to NK News.
Putin thanked North Korea for supporting Russia’s military operations. Under the mutual-defense agreement signed in 2024, Pyongyang sent approximately 14,000 soldiers to help Russian forces retake territory in the Kursk region after Ukraine’s cross-border offensive, according to Reuters.
The larger North Korean contribution has come from ammunition. Ukraine’s military intelligence told the Kyiv Post that Pyongyang now supplies between 25 and 40 percent of Russia’s artillery ammunition. The agency estimated that North Korea had delivered more than 7 million rounds, more than 100 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles, and over 600 artillery systems since June 2023.
Public estimates differ because governments and researchers use different container loads and munition categories. A Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team report documented more than 20,000 containers and estimated that Russian vessels carried as many as 9 million artillery and multiple-launch rocket rounds in 2024 alone. The precise total remains uncertain, but every credible estimate places the volume in the millions.
North Korean Ammunition Keeps Russia’s Artillery Firing
Russia’s war remains heavily dependent on artillery. Shell consumption has repeatedly exceeded what Moscow’s factories could replace quickly, making Pyongyang’s Soviet-compatible stockpiles and production lines unusually valuable. The practical contribution has been sustained artillery supply rather than the more visible troop deployments.
The monitoring team found that North Korea supplied 82mm, 122mm, 130mm, 152mm, and 170mm munitions used by Russian guns already in service. It also documented at least 100 ballistic missiles, more than 200 self-propelled guns, rocket launchers, reload vehicles, and related equipment. Those transfers have made Pyongyang one of Russia’s most consequential wartime suppliers.
Russia still manufactures large quantities of ammunition, but North Korean deliveries provided additional volume when Soviet-era reserves were declining and demand remained extreme. A Reuters investigation into the supply network noted that Russian and Ukrainian forces were each firing as many as 10,000 artillery rounds on some days. Even imperfect shells have operational value when they allow Russian units to maintain pressure without rationing every gun.
North Korean missiles have also improved during combat use. Ukrainian sources told Reuters in February 2025 that newer salvos were landing within roughly 50 to 100 meters of their intended targets, a marked change from earlier launches. Battlefield data gives North Korea information it could not obtain from isolated domestic tests.
North Korean Troops Helped Russia Retake Kursk
The soldiers mattered in a narrower but still important theater. Russia used North Korean units in Kursk, allowing Moscow to reinforce the region without pulling as many Russian formations away from operations elsewhere or ordering another politically difficult mobilization. The deployment gave Putin an additional source of trained manpower when Russian casualty rates remained high.
The cost to Pyongyang was severe. Ukrainian military intelligence estimated that North Korean forces suffered more than 7,000 killed and wounded during the Kursk campaign. The Kyiv Independent reported that the figure exceeded earlier South Korean and British estimates of about 6,000 casualties. None of the totals can be independently verified, and North Korea has not published a full accounting.
Early reports described North Korean soldiers as inexperienced with drones and modern battlefield surveillance. They adapted, gained combat experience, and learned Russian artillery, unmanned-aircraft, infantry, and trench-clearing procedures. That experience could return to the Korean Peninsula through instructors and revised training.
Pyongyang’s manpower role continued beyond combat. North Korea later agreed to send 1,000 sappers and 5,000 military construction workers to clear mines and rebuild Kursk, according to Reuters. Those deployments free Russian engineers and labor for other military and industrial requirements.
Russia Is Strengthening North Korea in Return
The relationship benefits Kim Jong Un as much as Putin. North Korea receives cash, energy, food, diplomatic protection, and access to Russian military expertise. The sanctions-monitoring report said Russia supplied air-defense and electronic-warfare equipment and provided feedback that improved North Korean missile guidance. The exchange is strengthening capabilities that threaten South Korea, Japan, and U.S. forces in Asia.
South Korean intelligence has assessed that Moscow may be providing technical advice on satellite launches and missile guidance in return for artillery ammunition and missiles. That trade gives Russia an immediate battlefield benefit while North Korea receives technology with effects that could last for decades.
The military partnership also weakens the sanctions system Russia once helped enforce. Moscow vetoed renewal of the United Nations panel responsible for monitoring North Korean sanctions in 2024, then openly acknowledged the troop deployment in 2025. What began as concealed shipping has become state policy.
North Korea’s Support Is Now Built Into Russia’s War
Choe’s promise to stand with Moscow until victory carries weight because the support is already embedded in Russia’s operations. North Korean shells help sustain daily artillery fire. North Korean missiles expand Russia’s long-range inventory. North Korean troops and engineers reduce pressure on Russian manpower.
The relationship may remain transactional and could change when the immediate wartime need declines. As of July 20, 2026, Russia still needs what Pyongyang can provide, while Kim is receiving money, technology, and combat experience in return.
The next indicators will be new shipping movements from North Korean ports, rail traffic across Russia, additional troop rotations, and the appearance of newer North Korean missiles or artillery systems in Ukraine. As of July 20, Pyongyang remains one of the outside powers supplying the ammunition and personnel Russia needs to continue the war.
About the Author: Harry J. Kazianis
Harry J. Kazianis (@Grecianformula) was the former Senior Director of National Security Affairs at the Center for the National Interest (CFTNI), a foreign policy think tank founded by Richard Nixon based in Washington, DC. Harry has over a decade of experience in think tanks and national security publishing. His ideas have been published in the NY Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, CNN, and many other outlets worldwide. He has held positions at CSIS, the Heritage Foundation, the University of Nottingham, and several other institutions related to national security research and studies. He is the former Executive Editor of the National Interest and the Diplomat. He holds a Master's degree focusing on international affairs from Harvard University.
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