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Reports of a new deal that would see the United States invest in Saudi Arabia‘s civilian nuclear capabilities have sparked concerns within Israel that the Kingdom could ultimately weaponize its program amid deepening unrest in the Middle East.
Israel has never publicly confirmed nor denied the existence of its own nuclear arsenal, though it has long been attested to by former top figures in both Israel and the U.S. Last year, as U.S.-Saudi discussions of potential nuclear collaboration picked up steam shortly before the 12-Day War between Israel and Iran, current and former Israeli officials told Newsweek such a move could spark a regional arms race.
Now, with the deal reported Tuesday and expected to be announced as early as Wednesday, those fears have resurfaced in even greater magnitude at an already volatile moment for a region witnessing renewed direct clashes between the U.S. and Iran, also involving Iranian strikes on Saudi Arabia and other U.S. partners in the Middle East.
Ariel Levite, former principal deputy director general of policy at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission who now serves as senior fellow at both the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Nuclear Policy Program and Harvard’s Belfer Center Managing the Atom, pointed out that even when U.S.-Saudi nuclear discussions first gained traction under former President Joe Biden’s administration, “it was very contentious that Israel would agree to enrichment plants in Saudi Arabia and so on, which is very disconcerting.”
But then, Israel aimed to link the deal and offset its risk through a normalization of diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia. Normalization negotiations largely dissolved with the onset of the war in Gaza in October 2023, however, and frictions over the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran launched in February have put Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a far tougher position.
“It was something that the current government in Israel was willing to contemplate in the context of normalization,” Levite told Newsweek. “Now, there is no normalization, so that’s point one.”
“Number two, we’re also in a situation where Netanyahu can’t really say no to Trump,” Levite said. “So, what happens is the Israeli government is hugely unhappy with this but has no [recourse], because they have already consented in principle, paid the price and they didn’t get the benefits.”
Could Saudi Arabia Build the Bomb?
Saudi Arabia has previously committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; however, some signals have exacerbated Israeli concerns.
Back in 2018, as Trump during his first term moved to scrap a 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman told CBS News that, “Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.”
Iran has also consistently denied any attempt to weaponize its nuclear program, though U.S. and Israeli officials have argued that the Islamic Republic’s advanced enrichment constituted a tacit attempt to acquire such capabilities, served as the pretext for sanctions and direct military action both during the 12-Day War last June and the ongoing campaign commenced in February.
Though Tehran continues to agree not to pursue nuclear weapons, the ongoing conflict and the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—the source of Iran’s official ban on such capabilities—have given rise to new debates within the Islamic Republic, now led by his son, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei and an increasingly influential presence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Currently, only one Muslim nation is known to possess nuclear weapons capabilities: Pakistan, a country with which Saudi Arabia has long enjoyed close ties. These relations were fortified into a formal defense pact last September, shortly after Israel conducted an unprecedented strike on a Hamas meeting in Qatar.
But questions have been raised regarding both the U.S. and Pakistan’s commitments to Saudi security since Iran began launching strikes across regional countries hosting U.S. military bases as a means of putting pressure on the U.S.-Israeli war effort.
Levite pointed out that, while enrichment facilities on Saudi soil would ostensibly be overseen by U.S. personnel, future escalations in the region could see Washington pull back its presence on the ground, leaving Riyadh solely in charge.
“So, the whole notion of the U.S. facility and so on doesn’t sound very credible. Number one,” Levite said. “Number two, it’s a country which has a lot of domestic security issues. So, there’s a second issue which makes you worried, and the government there could change into a different government that would be much more problematic and hostile.”
“And then it’s a country that has this deep security relationship with Pakistan, which isn’t particularly helpful in the nuclear context, in addition, which could help them with the nuclear weapons enterprise that you know that is there,” he continued.
But “worst of all,” he stated, was the omission of an Additional Protocol as well as the “Gold Standard,” included in other so-called nuclear 123 Agreements the U.S. has forged with the likes of the United Arab Emirates that commit to international inspections.
“Why would the U.S. agree to the Kingdom’s insistence that they don’t want the Additional Protocol if they have exclusively peaceful intent?” asked Levite. “What on earth would be the legitimacy of that pushback by Saudi Arabia, other than keeping the nuclear weapons option open?”
“And what are the broader implications of accepting such deficient arrangement in terms of the precedent it creates for other friendly countries’ nuclear ambitions, as well as China and Russia following suit with their buddies?”
Newsweek reached out to the Saudi Embassy to the U.S. and the U.S. State Department for comment.
Reinforcing Riyadh’s public position, Mohammed Alhamed, founder of the Saudi Elite Group, told Newsweek that the Kingdom has consistently supported efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation in the Middle East.
“Saudi Arabia has had opportunities in the past to pursue a military nuclear option but deliberately chose not to do so,” Alhamed said. “Its objective has always been to build a peaceful civilian nuclear program that enhances energy security, economic diversification, technological advancement, and long-term national development—not nuclear weapons.”
Why Would Trump Do This Now?
The Trump administration has a history of shoring up ties with Saudi Arabia, especially following a relatively cool period under Biden, who clashed with Riyadh on oil prices and human rights, among other issues.
With Saudi Arabia openly committed to a diversification of its foreign ties to include stronger relations with top U.S. rivals China and Russia, Trump has sought to cement Washington’s influence through high-profile deals such as a November 2025 package that included selling advanced equipment such as F-35 fighter jets—another capability currently only wielded by Israel in the Middle East.
Yet the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, which Saudi Arabia campaigned extensively to avoid, has once again strained relations between Washington and Riyadh. In addition to facing unprecedented strikes from Iran and an effective blockade of energy exports from east coast Persian Gulf ports, the Iran-aligned Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthi movement, with which Saudi Arabia has clashed in neighboring Yemen, is now threatening to target Saudi shipping along west coast ports in the Red Sea.
“From Washington’s perspective, moving forward with the nuclear agreement reflects a broader strategic calculation by the Trump administration,” Alhamed said. “The United States recognizes that its long-term interests in the Middle East are best served by deepening its strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia while preventing Russia or China from becoming the Kingdom’s primary partners in one of the world’s most strategically important industries.”
“Ultimately, this agreement is about strengthening trust and reinforcing a long-term strategic alliance between two key partners. U.S. foreign policy cannot be driven solely by Israeli preferences,” he added. “Just as Saudi Arabia pursues its own national interests, the United States is entitled to do the same. Strengthening ties with Riyadh serves American strategic, economic, and security interests across the Middle East.”
As for Israel, he argued Saudi Arabia’s position on a potential peace deal “has been clear, both publicly and privately.”
“The Kingdom continues to support a two-state solution and believes the Palestinian people should receive, at the very least, a meaningful portion of their legitimate rights,” Alhamed said.
Yoel Guzansky, senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies who previously served on Israel’s National Security Council and as adviser to several prime ministers, however, was more “pessimistic.”
“The people in the administration, I guess, will tell you, ‘Oh, this is how we keep the Saudis close to us and far away from China.’ Yeah, perhaps not necessarily,” Guzansky told Newsweek.
“And they will also tell you that this will give a lot of money to the American economy and especially to the nuclear industry, which has a lot of problems in the U.S.,” Guzansky said.
But while he recognized some potential domestic gains for the U.S., he warned that the “timing is just awful,” given that one of the key sticking points in stalled U.S.-Iran talks was Tehran’s insistence on maintaining some degree of enrichment on its territory, a capability now granted to Riyadh with Washington’s support.
Guzansky also noted some reservations regarding Saudi Arabia’s own outlook given the Kingdom’s growing efforts to pursue a more assertive regional policy, a campaign that has also exacerbated a feud with the neighboring UAE, which constitutes Israel’s top partner in the Middle East.
“I think that here in Israel, I’m not sure that the government will say that out loud, they don’t want to get into confrontation with the administration, Netanyahu will not want to do that with Trump, but you will hear it from experts and analysts like me that they have fear,” Guzansky said.
After all, he argued, Saudi Arabia “is not Switzerland.”
“It’s a country with a lot of money and aspiration and fear from Iran,” Guzansky said. “Bin Salman himself declared that once Iran has the bomb, he immediately will get the bomb. I believe him. We should believe him.”
“So, they have an aspiration for a nuclear military program,” he added. “Now, you give them the keys for the car and the drivers’ license.”
Contact Newsweek editors on this story: Frances Mao and Sam Wilson.
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