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Since the outbreak of U.S. and Israeli military operations against Iran, the regime and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have relied on the Strait of Hormuz as a primary source of leverage against the United States.
Even after devastating U.S. strikes on Iranian military infrastructure, a relatively small force of IRGC soldiers is threatening global energy markets by disrupting the world’s most important oil transit route - even as Washington promises safe passage with U.S. Navy escorts.
But Hormuz is not Tehran’s only option.
As U.S. strikes continue against Iranian infrastructure, Tehran is now expanding its asymmetric campaign by leaning heavily on its network of regional proxy groups that it has spent decades cultivating for precisely this reason.
That strategy is now visible in Yemen, where the Iran-backed Houthis have declared a blockade against Saudi Arabian exports and threatened shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the southern gateway to the Red Sea.
The announcement means that Iran has, in effect, opened a second maritime front and is placing pressure on one of the world’s other important energy corridors - right at the worst possible time.
Why the Red Sea Matters Right Now
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait connects the Gulf of Aden with the Red Sea before vessels continue north toward the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean.
At its narrowest point, the strait is only around 20 miles wide, making it another strategic maritime chokepoint where relatively inexpensive missiles, drones, naval mines, or explosive boats can threaten global commerce. And that’s precisely why Iran’s proxy groups are targeting it.
Under normal circumstances, as much as 12% of global seaborne trade passes through the Red Sea corridor, including significant volumes of crude oil, petroleum products, liquefied natural gas, and container shipping between Europe and Asia.
It is important even outside of wartime, but particularly important today given that Saudi Arabia has sought to minimize the impact of the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz by leaning on its East-West Pipeline, which transports crude from eastern oil fields to the Red Sea terminal at Yanbu.
This alternative route bypasses the Strait of Hormuz entirely. But with the new blockade, Saudi Arabia is now stuck.
The pipeline has been one of Riyadh’s main contingencies whenever Iran threatens Hormuz, but if the Houthi blockade remains in effect for the medium or long term, the strategic advantage disappears.
The U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia now have another reason to decimate Iranian capabilities - and hope that even a small remaining force cannot continue to exert disproportionate power over the waterways.
Houthis Declare Embargo
On Monday, July 20, Houthi spokesman Yahya Sarea accused Saudi Arabia in a televised statement of imposing an “unjust and oppressive siege on our dear people for nearly 12 years, plundering our resources and imposing a comprehensive blockade on our ports and airports by land, sea, and air.”
In the same statement, he announced that the Iran-backed group had declared a “maritime embargo against the criminal Saudi enemy, based on the equation of ‘an eye for an eye.’”
The Houthi spokesman also promised to escalate if Saudi Arabia or allies commit a “foolish act” - likely a reference to military strikes or operations designed to mitigate the impact of the blockade.
“Any foolish act committed by the reckless Saudi enemy through all escalation will be met with a comprehensive and decisive escalation," the statement reads.
The comments seem to suggest that the Houthis are framing the attack as a response to Saudi Arabia, which may well be the case - but the blockade comes at a convenient time.
Saudi Arabia is already preoccupied with ensuring it can maintain global oil exports, and it just potentially lost its main advantage over Iran’s effective control over Hormuz.
Similarly, the United States is already heavily engaged in strikes against Tehran and using naval resources to facilitate the crossing of commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz.
Why Now?
Beyond the obvious fact that the Houthis are supportive of the Iranian regime, the events of July 13, when explosions hit Sanaa International Airport, are a good excuse for the blockade to begin now.
The Houthis have accused Saudi Arabia of carrying out the attack and declared that it marked the end of a de-escalation period.
The official Yemeni government, however, said that its own forces deliberately targeted the runway to prevent an Iranian Mahan Air aircraft carrying a Houthi delegation from landing after it returned from Iran. Saudi Arabia has not claimed responsibility.
But who carried out the strike matters less than who controls the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Within hours of announcing the blockade, the Houthis launched missiles toward southern Saudi Arabia and warned that further attacks would be met with escalation - and in the meantime, the world watches with bated breath.
About the Author: Jack Buckby
Jack Buckby is a British researcher and analyst specializing in defense and national security, based in New York. His work focuses on military capability, procurement, and strategic competition, producing and editing analysis for policy and defense audiences. He brings extensive editorial experience, with a career output spanning over 1,000 articles at 19FortyFive and National Security Journal, and has previously authored books and papers on extremism and deradicalization.
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