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Russia entered 2026 with a familiar claim: time was on Vladimir Putin’s side. Moscow still held more territory and expected its larger population and industrial base to produce an eventual victory. Ukraine’s long-range drone and missile campaign has made that conclusion much harder to defend.
On July 20, Russian officials said Ukraine sent more than 400 drones toward Moscow and the surrounding region. Reuters reported fires at an industrial park, damage near the capital, and 10 injuries. Russia claimed hundreds of interceptions, yet Ukraine still forced the country’s most heavily defended region into an overnight operation lasting more than eight hours.
The campaign has reached Russia’s energy system. A July 6 strike hit the Omsk refinery, Russia’s largest, roughly 2,700 kilometers from Ukrainian-held territory. The attack showed that even Siberia was within range. Russia later rerouted fuel from Siberia and increased imports from Belarus after refinery damage reduced gasoline output and created shortages, according to another Reuters assessment.
Russia is paying that domestic cost while gaining ground slowly. The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that Moscow suffered about 1.4 million battlefield casualties, including as many as 450,000 deaths, from February 2022 through June 2026 for marginal gains. Its July analysis shows why the idea of an inexpensive Russian victory has collapsed.
Ukraine Turned Russia’s Strategic Depth Into a Liability
Distance once protected Russia’s bomber bases, refineries, factories, and logistics hubs. Ukraine has reduced that protection through attacks from the Black Sea to the Urals. The ability to fly 1,500 miles into Russia forces Moscow to defend sites that previously required little protection.
Operation Spiderweb exposed another weakness. Ukraine launched 117 drones from containers positioned near Russian air bases and damaged or destroyed strategic bombers, according to satellite imagery reviewed by Reuters. Those aircraft cannot be replaced quickly, and each confirmed loss reduces a finite missile-launching fleet.
Putin Cannot Defend Every Target
Russia must protect the front, Moscow, strategic airfields, oil infrastructure, ports, power plants, factories, and commercial logistics. Ukraine chooses where to concentrate each wave, creating a defensive allocation problem the Kremlin cannot eliminate.
The smoke over Wildberries warehouses near Moscow made the problem visible. Russia claimed 379 interceptions during one July operation, but major fires still disrupted the region. Moscow can add radars, guns, electronic warfare, and interceptor missiles. It cannot place the same layered defense around every fixed site across 11 time zones. The Omsk attack showed how one successful penetration can create national supply consequences.
Russia’s Battlefield Gains No Longer Equal Victory
Russian forces still advance in parts of eastern Ukraine, and Kyiv faces serious manpower, ammunition, and air-defense shortages. Moscow remains capable of inflicting enormous damage. Those facts do not give Putin a credible path to his stated objectives.
The Institute for the Study of War estimated on June 30 that Russia still needed to capture about 5,305 square kilometers to seize the rest of Donetsk and was highly unlikely to finish by the end of 2026. That assessment fits a broader trend in which Russian advances have slowed sharply while the cost of sustaining them rises.
Putin invaded to subordinate Ukraine, weaken its military, block its Western alignment, and demonstrate Russian power. Ukraine now operates one of Europe’s largest militaries, produces long-range weapons, strikes Moscow and Siberia, damages strategic bombers, and forces Russia to disperse air defenses. Moscow occupies Ukrainian land but has failed to secure the political outcome intended to justify the war.
Russia Is Losing the War It Chose
The expectation of inevitable Russian victory depended on Ukraine running out of men, weapons, and time before Russia’s internal costs became decisive. Ukraine’s deep-strike campaign transfers more of the war’s cost into Russian territory while Moscow’s ground forces continue paying heavily for limited movement.
As of July 22, Russia faces fuel disruption, repeated attacks near its capital, vulnerable strategic aircraft, slowing advances, and no credible timetable for meeting its territorial demands. Putin began the invasion expecting Ukraine to break. Four years later, Ukraine can strike the Russian interior while Russia remains thousands of square kilometers short of completing its campaign in Donetsk.
About the Author: Harry J. Kazianis
Harry J. Kazianis (@Grecianformula) was the former Senior Director of National Security Affairs at the Center for the National Interest (CFTNI), a foreign policy think tank founded by Richard Nixon based in Washington, DC. Harry has over a decade of experience in think tanks and national security publishing. His ideas have been published in the NY Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, CNN, and many other outlets worldwide. He has held positions at CSIS, the Heritage Foundation, the University of Nottingham, and several other institutions related to national security research and studies. He is the former Executive Editor of the National Interest and the Diplomat. He holds a Master's degree focusing on international affairs from Harvard University.
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