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Welcome to Trump’s America, The i Paper’s World Insight series presenting the sharpest, deepest thinking on an era-defining shift in history and politics, investigating how Donald Trump and his administration have changed the US and the world – and where we go from here.
• America can’t afford to retire
• The US is becoming impossible to live in
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The White House I worked for would have condemned this image. Trump refuses
• Maga leaders want ‘traditional American families’ – but can’t stop having affairs
• Sin City has lost its shine. It shows how far America has fallen• The Florida street that exposes America’s growing homophobia
• Inside America’s most loyal Trump town – where people still think he’s ‘a good man’
Since coming to office as US Secretary of Defence – later War – last year, Pete Hegseth has spoken at great length about his desire to turn America’s warfighting machine away from “woke distractions” and return to “lethality” and “joint warfighting”. He has remained hyperfocused on the kinds of small-unit-level complaints one would expect to be more in the purview of a battalion sergeant major than a cabinet secretary.
When it comes to the tactical and operational levels of war, the US military is undoubtedly effective. From the synchronised global reach to destroy Iran’s nuclear research facilities last summer, to the precision of America’s special operations forces during the capture of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro, American mastery of the mechanics of combat has been on display. This kind of skill cannot be developed overnight and is indicative of the capabilities that have been created and refined across multiple preceding administrations.
Secretary Hegseth has been eager to point to these examples as prima facie evidence that the department he leads is better, more lethal and more focused than the versions under the Biden or Obama administrations, using the disastrous ending of the war in Afghanistan or the fight against Isis as counter-examples. In multiple press briefings during the first month of the current war with Iran, Hegseth pounded his chest about “death and destruction from the sky all day long”.
Yet, as negotiations under the framework of the US-Iranian memorandum of understanding continue (at least nominally), any objective reading of the situation clearly illustrates that the United States failed to achieve any of the goals it set forth when initiating the conflict. We did not change the regime or permanently destroy the Iranian ballistic missile capability. We did not sever Iran’s links to its regional terror proxies; in fact, we strengthened them by extending the protection of the ceasefire to Hezbollah at Iran’s demand.
The extensive damage we did to Iran’s nuclear programme was accomplished last year with no substantive additional effects achieved by Epic Fury. We did, however, demonstrate to the Iranians and the world that Iran does, in fact, retain a strategic deterrent that it can flex at any time to compel international concessions – de facto control over the Strait of Hormuz.
So how could a conflict that was such a clear example of tactical overmatch – in which the United States enjoyed air dominance over Iran, in which Iranian missile strikes were largely swatted out of the air by ballistic missile defence, and in which the US took thankfully few casualties while inflicting thousands – have resulted in such a strategic defeat?
If war is an extension of politics by other means, the killing, targeting and destruction are those other means, not the goal unto itself. It is possible for inflicting casualties to translate into political achievements, either by inflicting so many that the adversary cannot replace the losses and sustain the fight as in total war, or by creating a cost incentive wherein the adversary believes the continued toll is not worth it as in a limited war. But one should avoid solipsism or wish-casting in believing that initial strikes will force the hand of an adversary who might have a high threshold for loss. We only need look to the massive casualties Iran endured in its war with Iraq in the 1980s to assume it will not be so easily cowed by the butcher’s bill.
Hegseth has demonstrated from the beginning of his tenure that he is poorly suited for the responsibilities of the office he holds, focusing on childish attacks on political rivals, on limiting reporting and oversight of his department, and defaulting to micromanagement of issues better dealt with by lieutenants and captains. Instead of realising his role is to act as the link to translate the military’s lethality into political goals that it is a part of achieving, Hegseth seems to believe the killing is a goal unto itself. But he fails to answer the simple question: does increased death do anything to benefit the United States? Do the funerals of IRGC commanders change our position in any way if they are not further translated into some Iranian concession or capitulation?
The brief conflict with Iran will join Afghanistan and Vietnam as examples where we demonstrated the ability to kill our enemies in numbers vastly superior to the casualties they inflicted upon us, but that did not result in the political goals we sought out to achieve by going to war. There is currently a communist flag flying over the city formerly known as Hanoi, a Taliban one flying over Kabul, and an entrenched and resistant Iranian regime who has, as of yet, offered no substantive concessions in Tehran.
The United States does need to make innovations and changes to prepare for the next fight – be it against a smaller regional threat or against a competitor. The pace and nature of warfare are going through an evolution, and integrating the new technologies and tactics developed will be necessary to keep the United States and our allies ahead of malign actors who might wish to use force to reshape the world for the worse. But all of that innovation will be for nought if the United States forgets the eternal truths of conflict as to why nations fight.
It is unlikely Hegseth will mature to fill the responsibility and vision required of his role. Until the United States finds a defence chief who will, we will be hindered by a glorified platoon leader, focused on platoon leader-level problems when the country, and the world, require an understanding of global ones.
