When French officer Antoine de la Mothe Cadillac planted the royal banner of France on the banks of détroit (French for “strait”) on July 24, 1701, he couldn’t possibly have imagined the wheels he was setting in motion.
Four wheels, to be precise.
Those wheels (wire-spoke bicycle wheels, in fact) were attached to a wobbly, baby buggy–like contraption with a tiny two-cylinder engine good for a wheezy 4 horsepower. Yet when Henry Ford grabbed the engine’s flywheel, gave it a spin, and fired up his creation in the wee hours of June 4, 1896, he might as well have set off a bomb. Detroit—and the world—would never be the same.
By 1900, Detroit had evolved into a gorgeous and sophisticated city, with Beaux-Arts architecture lining French-inspired, wide avenues and boulevards arranged in an elegant radial, hub-and-spoke layout. Designer Augustus Woodward—today honored by the city’s most famous thoroughfare, Woodward Avenue—took inspiration from the streetscapes of Paris, all of which earned Detroit the nickname “the Paris of the Midwest.”
The decorum of those quiet streets, however, was about to be shattered.
For the first two decades of the 20th century, Detroit was as lawless as the Wild West and as innovative as Silicon Valley, dominated by swashbuckling, fearless founders who stood to make unimaginable millions producing a revolutionary new technology: the automobile.
In the beginning, there were Henry, brilliant yet deeply flawed, and his earliest suppliers, brothers John and Horace Dodge, who owned one of the best machine shops in the Midwest. The three men were studies in opposites, and throughout their entire relationship, they never got along. Henry was famously a teetotaler and often railed against the evils of alcohol, whereas the Dodge boys never passed up the chance to throw back a drink or two. Or six.
They were different physically, too. Henry, thin as a rail, was constantly in motion, with piercing eyes. Throughout his life, he stayed active and lean, with his appearance often described as “youthful” and “energetic” even into his 80s. John and Horace, by contrast, were stocky, red-headed rabble-rousers who chugalugged whatever got them drunkest the fastest, their faces often puffy from late nights spent drinking and carousing. John was four years older than Horace and oversaw their company’s finances and contracts, while Horace was a mechanical genius with dirt permanently under his nails and grease on his hands, as if he were being fingerprinted for a crime. Despite these differences (or perhaps because of them), with Henry’s vision for the automobile matched with the manufacturing capabilities of the Dodge boys, anything was possible.
“Crazy Henry.”
That’s what the neighbors up and down Bagley Avenue in Detroit called him. “Crazy” because of his all-consuming, relentless obsession with creating a gas-powered motor car. When he wasn’t working as chief engineer at the Edison Illuminating Company of Detroit, Henry spent every waking hour in the brick shed behind the house he rented with his wife, Clara (“Callie” was his pet name for her), and their only child, Edsel, born in November 1893. Most times, Henry would ignore the mockery. When he did deign to acknowledge it, he would tap his temple with his finger, nod slowly, and reply, “Yes, I’m crazy,” a slightly amused smile crossing his face. “Crazy like a fox.”
Two businesses were founded and failed before Henry proved his neighbors wrong, but the third time was indeed the charm: The Ford Motor Company was incorporated on June 16, 1903, and although it suffered initial growing pains, within a few years its success was assured. There were Henry plus 11 shareholders—a small but influential group of Detroit businessmen who provided the seed money Ford needed to start his company—two of whom were John and Horace Dodge, who served as the company’s largest supplier. At Ford Motor Company’s inception, its automobiles were actually more Dodge than Ford. Between 1903 and 1914, the Dodge brothers supplied every major component of a Ford automobile—up to and including the Model T—except for the wheels, tires, and bodies. By mid-1914, the annual production of Dodge’s Hamtramck factory was prodigious: 240,000 transmissions, 225,000 rear axles, 190,000 front axles, 205,000 crankshafts, 855,000 connecting rods, 412,000 U-joints, and another dozen major parts or assemblies.
From the beginning, however, Henry was at war with his shareholders. He advocated for a light, inexpensive car with a four-cylinder engine, whereas the other shareholders wanted a big, expensive car with a six-cylinder engine. Henry would not be denied. In January 1907, he began work in a secret shop on the third floor of the Ford factory on Piquette Avenue in Detroit. The shop was outfitted with a few tools, a chalkboard for sketching ideas, and a rocking chair that had once belonged to Henry’s mother. He would sit in that chair and rock for hours, surrounded by a few select workers, overseeing and discussing the development of his great invention: the Model T.
By the spring of 1908, workers had completed a few Ts for testing. The car was everything Henry had conceptualized, bold and brilliant in its simplicity. The T was light, durable, and easy to operate and repair. Most important, at $850 for the five-seat touring version and $825 for the two-seat runabout, it was roughly half the price of the competition. The Model T went on sale on September 27, 1908. Only 11 cars were sold in October, but by December, 200 cars had been sold. The production numbers were limited by the inefficient layout of the Piquette plant. The second floor housed light machining and sub-assembly, while engines and axles were assembled on the ground floor. By January 1910, the purpose-built factory at Highland Park was ready for the next phase of Henry’s vision: perfecting the moving assembly line.
The exact source of inspiration for the moving assembly line is not clear—some claim it came from the meatpacking industry, while Henry himself claimed the idea came to him when he visited a watch factory and observed the use of a staged assembly process—but the result cannot be denied. In August 1913, before the concept was implemented, it took an average of 12.5 working hours to produce a Model T. A year later, after the moving assembly line was in full swing, it took just 1.5 working hours. From 1903 to 1908, Ford had built less than 10 percent of the cars in the U.S. By 1914, it had produced almost half of them.
Though the production numbers are staggering, they came at a very human cost. The work on the assembly line was viciously repetitive, turning people into mindless drones and causing incredibly high turnover rates in Ford’s workforce.
By 1913, accountants determined the company was spending $3 million annually in training new employees. Ford’s greatest innovation, the moving assembly line, had become the company’s greatest curse. The solution: raise wages to $5 per day. Exactly who came up with the inspiration for this transformative event is unclear. One version credits Ford’s general manager, James Couzens, with the idea. Another version, related in the reminiscences of other employees, credits Henry. Suffice it to say, ultimately both men would have had to approve the policy, otherwise it would not have been adopted.
There were a couple of long strings attached. First, Henry insisted that the wage be considered profit-sharing so that it could be withdrawn if the company suffered a downturn. If a worker earned $2.30 a day under the old pay structure, for example, they still earned that wage. If a worker met all of the company’s requirements, they earned a daily bonus of $2.70. To ensure the workers met those requirements, Ford established the Sociological Department to monitor employees’ behavior outside the workplace.
Workers had to abstain from alcohol, not abuse their families, not take in boarders, keep their homes clean, and contribute regularly to a savings account. Ford inspectors visited workers’ homes and recorded the general living conditions. If “violations” were identified, the inspectors directed the families to resources offered through the company to resolve them. Only after these problems were corrected did the employee receive his full bonus.
The announcement came on January 5, 1914. In a single stroke, Ford had not only created the American middle class but also a whole new group of customers. The people who built the Model T could now afford to buy one.
On January 6, several thousand men showed up at Highland Park looking for work. The situation quickly spiraled out of control. Riots erupted, and the crowds were dispersed with fire hoses in the icy January weather. Ford announced that it would only hire workers who had lived in Detroit for at least six months, and the situation slowly came under control. The system worked; absenteeism dropped from 10 percent per day to less than 0.5 percent. Detroit’s population exploded. In 1900, it had 285,704 residents. In 1910, that number was 465,766, making it the ninth-largest city in the U.S. By 1920, there were 993,678 residents, more than doubling over the decade.
The other Detroit automakers accused Henry of being a traitor to his class and that he would destroy the industry. The issue went from being a local sensation to a national one. In one editorial, The New York Globe opined, “It has all the advantages and none of the disadvantages of socialism.” A reporter for The New York Times who was present when publisher Adolph Ochs received the news heard Ochs say of Henry, “He’s crazy, isn’t he? Don’t you think he’s crazy?”
Henry’s old neighbors on Bagley Avenue knew the truth. Ford’s sales surged, powered in part by the Model T’s pricing—which dropped to $550 in 1913 to $360 in 1916. It became a virtuous circle—the cheaper the car, the greater the sales, and the greater the sales, the cheaper the car. Henry once quipped, “Every time I lower the price by a dollar, I get a thousand new buyers.”
The money came in torrents. The investors had already seen a return on their initial investments of nearly 300 percent. Dividends were $500,000 in 1908, the year the Model T was introduced, and its sales proved to be rocket fuel for the company’s profits. Dividends shot up to $3.6 million in 1909—the Model T’s first full year of production—then $2.3 million in 1910. By October 1915, a total of $41 million in special dividends had been paid.
As the dividends went higher, so did Henry’s blood pressure. He believed that anyone who wasn’t making a hands-on contribution to the manufacturing process was, in his mind, a “parasite.” Adding to his frustration, the Dodge brothers had launched their own automobile company in 1914. Highland Park’s manufacturing capabilities made Dodge’s services redundant, ending the lucrative supplier contracts. Henry decided to turn off the taps. In 1916, he shocked the business world with the bombshell news that Ford dividends—which had totaled $60 million the previous year—would be restricted to a pitifully scant $1.2 million annually. This meant that the brothers’ 10 percent of dividends, which had previously been worth upward of $6 million annually, would now be worth no more than $120,000 per year going forward. Henry hated the idea of his company’s profits directly bankrolling the brothers’ automaking venture.
He especially hated that within a year of its introduction, Dodge Brothers’ new car, the Model 30-35, ranked third in sales despite its price of $785 compared with $490 for the T. The Model 30-35 was vastly superior to the T in several crucial areas. It had a more powerful 35-hp four-cylinder engine, ran on a 12-volt system versus a 6-volt, featured a starter-generator instead of a difficult hand-crank starter, and had a sturdy all-steel body rather than the T’s creaky wood-frame construction.
Henry wanted to stop funding the operations of the Dodges and enriching the rest of the shareholders. Publicly, he stated his desire was “to employ still more men, to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their homes. To do this we are putting the greatest share of our profits back in the business.”
While perhaps true to some degree, Henry’s generosity should not be overestimated. With the shareholders out of the picture, Henry could funnel all Ford Motor Company’s profits into building his vision of a fully integrated industrial complex—what would become the River Rouge complex—where raw materials would enter one end of the factory and emerge as complete cars out of the other. From there, he could ship his cars to any port he pleased: through the Great Lakes to Cleveland, Chicago, Buffalo, and beyond. This set him on a collision course with the shareholders, and only Henry could emerge the winner. But the brothers wanted their money; not only were they ready for a fight, they welcomed it.
Fighting, fortunately, was in their nature. Their specialty was busting up local watering holes; on one memorable occasion, John demanded that the proprietor of one establishment dance on a table for John’s amusement. When the proprietor demurred, John pulled a revolver and snarled, “I mean what I say and I want you to get up on that table and dance!” So dance he did. Was this Detroit or Deadwood?
The next day, the bar owner showed up at Dodge’s office with his attorney. “Mr. Dodge,” the attorney began. “Here’s a man who’s going to make trouble unless you do the right thing. You threw glasses last night and broke the bar mirror. In addition, you pulled a gun on him, which is against the law; you had no business carrying one, which is another thing. This man is sore and mad, and as his attorney, I’m going to see that you do something or else we’ll sue you.” John readily admitted to the accusation: “I guess that’s so. I did get loaded. All right, I’ll settle with him. How much does he want?” To which the attorney stated, “He wants $35,000.” (Roughly $1 million today.) Dodge replied curtly, “I’ll draw him a check.”
The more money the brothers got, the more the brothers spent, and they had elevated spending to an art: There were multiple mansions, multiple yachts, and plenty of paintings, sculptures, and artworks to fill them. And since the brothers had canceled their supply contracts with Ford in 1913 to start their own automobile manufacturing company, they needed more cash to fund that venture. Ford was sitting on $60 million in cash; the brothers owned 10 percent of the Ford Motor Company, and they wanted the dividends owed to them. It was time for a lawsuit.
The brothers’ timing put a sharp barb on their point: They filed suit on November 2, 1916, the day after Edsel Ford’s wedding, which John Dodge had attended quite congenially and without a hint of what was about to go down. Dodge v. Ford was on.
How Henry learned of the lawsuit was brutal. He and Clara were at the train station saying farewell to Thomas Edison and his wife, who had attended Edsel’s wedding. One of Ford’s branch managers ran up to the group clutching the evening edition of the Detroit Journal and pointed excitedly at its headline, the giant letters spilling across much of the front page: “Dodge Brothers Sue Ford!” Henry’s rage was incandescent. Once he had regained his composure, he decided on his response. He would plead his case in the court of public opinion.
Henry started by telephoning his friend E.G. Pipp, who, as editor-in-chief of The Detroit News, could publicize Ford’s side of the story. Now it was the Dodges’ turn to be savaged in the newspapers. “Ford makes reply to suit brought by Dodge Brothers,” the headline blared. “Says present plans of expansion are only in line with past history of company. Declares that on investment of $10,000 Dodge have drawn out $5,571,500 in dividends and still have holdings that they value at $50 million.” In the staged interview, Henry painted himself as a philanthropist whose primary interest was providing his customers with the cheapest car possible and his employees with good wages. In contrast, the Dodges and the rest of the shareholders were driven by greed.
“Dodge Brothers say I ought to continue to ask $440 for a car,” stated Henry. “Would I be serving the interest of our firm best by holding up the price because the manufacturer of another automobile [i.e., the Dodge Brothers] wants us to, or by reducing the price in the interest of our own customers, our own employees, and our own business standing and profit?”
He summed up his position by asking rhetorically, “Did you ever before in your life hear of any concern being complained of because the goods were sold at too low a price, as the Dodge Brothers allege we are doing?” Henry would soon get his answer.
At 9 a.m. on Tuesday, November 14, Henry walked into a small courtroom in downtown Detroit. The actual trial of Dodge v. Ford would not begin for months, but Henry was in attendance to testify on the issue that was of the greatest importance to him. The outcome of these preliminary hearings would determine whether Henry could move forward with his plans to expand the Rouge while he waited for the actual lawsuit to be heard.
Elliott Stevenson, attorney for the Dodges, listed their allegations, then began his attack by calling Henry to the witness stand. “The Detroit News seems to be your oracle for disseminating your views, and Mr. Pipp your subcounsel,” he bellowed. Snatching a newspaper off the plaintiffs’ table, Stevenson dramatically began to read Pipp’s article, quoting Henry back to himself. “‘And let me say right here that I do not believe we should make such awful profits on our car. A reasonable profit is right, but not too much. It has been my policy to force the price of the car down as fast as production would permit.’”
Stevenson asked Henry, “Is that your statement?”
“Yes,” replied Henry.
“What is your policy about this business, Mr. Ford?”
“In what respect?”
“You say you do not think it is right to make such profits? What is this business being continued for, and why is it being enlarged?”
“To do as much good as possible for everybody concerned.”
“What do you mean ‘by doing as much good as possible’?”
“To make money and use it, give employment, and send out the car where people can use it.”
“Haven’t you said you had enough money yourself and you were going to run the company hereafter to employ just as many people as you could and give them all the benefits of the high wages you pay, and give the public benefit of a low-priced car?”
Ford answered he supposed he had—“and incidentally to make money.”
Stevenson pounced. “Incidentally?” he yelled.
“That’s right,” Henry nodded benevolently. “Business is a service, not a bonanza.”
A month later in mid-December, the court issued its injunction. Ford Motor Company could not use its surplus money to build a blast furnace at the Rouge, at least until the question of dividends was settled. That verdict came on October 31, 1917. “Henry Ford Beaten in $60,000,000 Suit” read The New York Times the next day.
Ford appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court. On February 7, 1919, the court issued a verdict where each side could claim victory—as well as defeat. The court determined that a business corporation was formed and run primarily for the profit of its stockholders. Although Henry’s altruistic impulses were admirable, the court determined that the Ford Motor Company was prosperous enough to both expand the Rouge plant and pay large dividends at the same time. The court would not interfere with the company’s plans for expansion; however, Ford must pay a reasonable dividend and decreed that $19.3 million be distributed to the company’s shareholders. While the shareholders would receive their dividends, however, they couldn’t outfox Crazy Henry.
A few months before the final judgment in February, Henry had announced his resignation from Ford Motor Company. When asked why, he told reporters with an air of mystery that he was leaving to “devote my time to building up other organizations with which I am connected.” Rumors about his intentions ran rampant in the press, which had made a full-time business of reporting on Henry’s every utterance. On March 5, 1919, a month after the Michigan Supreme Court’s final verdict, Henry made the announcement the world was waiting to hear: He was starting a new business. It would build a cheaper, better car that would be half the price of the existing car— a “super” Model T. Sales of the existing Model T dropped as the public awaited this new super T, and shareholders got nervous.
Henry’s next move was to begin anonymously sounding out the willingness of the other stockholders to sell their shares. Though some suspected a ruse, most believed that if Henry’s intentions were serious, it would put an end to the rich dividends, the rights to which they had recently regained. Resistance collapsed, the shareholders conceded: They would sell. Upon hearing the news, Henry danced a merry jig, then later confessed to reporters, “Of course, there is no need of a new company now.”
However, Henry was cash poor from paying the dividends required by the lawsuit. To buy out his shareholders, he needed money. He had never borrowed money in his life—not privately, not publicly. He had never taken a mortgage for a home, and all of the factories had been built through earnings and paying reduced dividends. In one of the earliest examples of a leveraged buyout, Ford borrowed $75 million and for a total of $105 million, Henry, Edsel, and Clara became the sole owners of the Ford Motor Company. By comparison, at the height of his involvement, John D. Rockefeller Sr. held just 30 percent of Standard Oil.
For their original investment of $10,000, the Dodge brothers had received $5.4 million in dividends from Ford and $1.7 million in profits from their contracts for manufacturing parts for Ford. With the sale of their stock, each brother received $12.5 million. But less than six months later, both brothers fell ill with pneumonia after attending the New York auto show. John, whose health was already fragile from decades of drinking, succumbed on January 14, 1920, at the age of 55.
Horace recovered from pneumonia but not from the death of his brother. Chronically ill throughout the remainder of 1920 and psychologically adrift from John’s death, Horace saw no purpose in going on. He spent the last days of his life at his oceanside mansion in Palm Beach, Florida, where he died on December 10, 1920, age 52. Inseparable in life, the brothers were now inseparable in death. The cause of death was listed as cirrhosis of the liver, but the world knew the truth: Horace Dodge died of a broken heart.
While the Dodge brothers were laid to rest side by side in the family mausoleum, their ghosts still hovered over the company. John’s widow, Matilda, and Horace’s widow, Anna, were treating the business like their private piggy bank, siphoning off dividends and demanding various funds and loans. Fortunately, the company was flourishing under the steady leadership of president and general manager F.J. Haynes and his board of directors, with sales ranking as high as third in 1921. In 1925, the two widows decided to get out of Dodge, so to speak, with a sale to the investment firm of Dillon, Read, & Company for an all-cash deal of $146 million—cited by business historians as the largest cash transaction in history up to that time.
It only took Dillon, Read three short years to run Dodge into the ground. By 1927, Dodge ranked 13th in sales and Dillon, Read was ready for an exit. Walter P. Chrysler, head of the eponymously named automaker, was ready to deal, but since he lacked cash, it would have to be purely a stock transfer. For $170 million in shares of the new Chrysler Corporation, the deal was consummated on May 28, 1928. That same year, Walter P. was named Time magazine’s Man of the Year.
Meanwhile, the Ford Motor Company remained privately held by the Ford family until January 1956, when the company went public with an initial offering of $657 million that is considered the largest IPO of the pre-tech modern era. Shrewdly, the Ford family retained 40 percent of voting shares, enabling them to effectively control the company and its governance.
More than 100 years later, the industrial leviathan known today as the Ford Rouge Center covers 600 acres. Raw materials enter one end of the complex and vehicles emerge from the other—exactly as its creator envisioned. The Rouge has produced more than 19 million vehicles, including the Model T, the Model A, and 6.7 million Mustangs. From 1942 to 1945, the Rouge assembled jeeps, tanks, and trucks, helping Detroit earn the name the “Arsenal of Democracy” and enabling the Allies to win World War II. Today, the Rouge produces the F-Series lineup of trucks, the bestselling vehicles in America for 44 years straight, and cranked out 801,525 trucks in 2025 alone.
Crazy Henry indeed.
This story first appeared in the America 250 digital issue of Hagerty Drivers Club magazine. Join the club to receive our award-winning magazine and enjoy insider access to automotive events, discounts, roadside assistance, and more.
The post Dodge vs. Ford: Over a Century Ago, an Epic Grudge Match Raged In Detroit appeared first on Hagerty Media.
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