SerpApi.Org
The tiny island nations of the South Pacific have long been the battleground for a game of power and influence instigated by China.
For years Beijing poured in hundreds of millions of pounds of investment, asking for diplomatic ties and military access in return.
But now the tide is turning as Australia reasserts itself in the region, taking on China at its own game.
“We had started to be outplayed,” said John Blaxland, a former Australian army officer.
“So we’ve been playing catch-up and pedalling pretty furiously to do so,” he added.
In the past year, Australia has doubled its number of mutual defence treaties, signing a new pact with Papua New Guinea and another, more recently, with Fiji.
It also signed a cooperation agreement with Vanuatu last month – blocking any future attempt by China to establish a military base in the country – and has another two deals on the way with the Solomon Islands and Tonga.
Through these agreements, Australia is able to expand its security net over the region while countering China’s influence in its own backyard.
China has not been happy with the pivot.
On the same day that Australia announced its new pact with Fiji, Beijing launched a ballistic test missile into the Pacific, which experts said was almost certainly a pointed message at both Canberra and the Pacific Island nations – and an ominous sign of what could come.
Prized geography
With mounting threats from China towards Taiwan and in the South China Sea, the prospect of a war breaking out on Australia’s doorstep has become increasingly realistic. In turn, the focus on the Pacific Islands has grown.
Both theatres have the potential to escalate into a conflict – and either would inevitably involve Australia.
While Australia’s northern coast is more than 3,000 miles from Taiwan, it is still significantly closer than the continental United States or Europe, allowing it to serve as a critical base from which the US and allies could resupply and refuel.
“Australia is now being seen with that level of suitability as real estate. Marine bases, intelligence bases or bomber bases. That’s why we’re more important to [the US] now than ever,” Mr Blaxland said.
Under the government of Anthony Albanese, Australia has boosted its domestic defence capabilities, undertaking the largest peacetime increase in defence spending in Australia’s history and developing new stealth technology, including “ghost bat” MQ-28A drones and underwater vessels known as “sharks”.
Many of the Pacific’s island countries sit between the shipping lanes that connect Australia with the United States and would play a critical role in resupply missions during a conflict.
”The South Pacific is part of the umbilical cord that connects Australia to our big US ally, and that was made physically obvious during World War Two,” said Michael Shoebridge, a former Australian intelligence official and the founder of the Strategic Analysis Australia think tank.
China fills the void
For years Australia’s focus was not on the Pacific.
Mr Blaxland explained that with continuous wars in the Middle East during the early 2000s, Canberra neglected large parts of Asia and Oceania.
“There’s a saying about Australian policy makers: ‘We’re not very good at walking and chewing gum’,” said Mr Blaxland, who added that during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, he was a defence attaché in south-east Asia and would have to plead for attention from the government in Canberra.
While Australia remained the largest donor to the Pacific, when it shifted its focus away from the region, it left a void open for other countries to fill – and China stepped up to the challenge.
Beijing came in offering hundreds of millions of pounds in development aid and loans to build up local critical infrastructure, including ports, roads and government buildings, and in some cases also provided security assistance.
In return, China received access to resources, such as timber, fish and critical minerals, and inserted itself militarily in a region valuable to both the US and Australia.
In 2022, Beijing signed a secretive security agreement with the Solomon Islands, allowing it to establish a military presence in the country. It also established police teams in Vanuatu and Kiribati, which do not have their own armed forces.
“China has a lot of influence, whether it’s through concessional loans, whether it’s through the assistance it provides. It has a lot of soft influence, because for a while it was the only partner providing infrastructure, and it still does,” said Sione Tekiteki, who served in several roles in the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.
With China’s backing, three countries in the Pacific, including the Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Nauru, switched their diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, bringing the number of countries that recognised Taiwan down to 12.
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However, getting into bed with China comes at a cost.
“There’s been a growing awareness across the South Pacific that the sort of gifts and economic injections from China aren’t free,” Mr Shoebridge said.
In the Solomon Islands, China poured money into politics, allegedly bribing politicians to back favourable legislation and newspapers to publish content that pleased Beijing.
In Micronesia, President David Panuelo accused China of “political warfare” after it spied on the country and offered bribes to elected officials to ensure support for Beijing in the event of a war with Taiwan.
Quid pro quo
Growing awareness of China’s tactics, aided in part by new governments in many Pacific Island countries and a shift in focus by the Albanese government in Canberra, has brought Australia back into the fold.
For the Pacific Islands, many of the concerns are less to do with hard defence and pertain more to human, economic and environmental security.
Most island nations are looking for investments in renewable energy and infrastructure to tackle rising sea levels and other environmental concerns, explained Mr Blaxland.
Some, like Fiji, are also looking for help to tighten restrictions on illegal fishing and transnational crime, which have run rampant in recent years.
”It’s a concession. Because Australia is very much looking for security guarantees, and the Pacific is thinking, what can it get in return,” said Mr Tekiteki, who is now a senior lecturer at the Auckland University of Technology.
Economic mobility has also been a key concern for Pacific Islanders – a point which Australia knows all too well and seemed to use as leverage during its negotiations with Vanuatu.
Earlier in the year, Australia had excluded Vanuatu from its Pacific Engagement Visa ballot, a scheme that allows Pacific Islanders to gain permanent residency in Australia.
Two days after it signed its agreement with Vanuatu, 150 slots in the program were restored.
“They didn’t give a reason, but you can put two and two together,” said Mr Tekiteki.
Vanuatu also played hard ball. Its government delayed the agreement by 10 months because of a consultation clause that could restrict Vanuatu’s sovereignty and block it from receiving investments from other countries, including China.
“You can imagine the negotiation: ‘I know this is going to upset China so what are you going to give me to make this worth my while?’,” said Mr Shoebridge.
Initially, the pact would have given Canberra the power to veto any investment, but the final draft stipulates that Vanuatu must only “consult” with Australia.
Beijing flexes its muscle
Days after the Vanuatu agreement was signed, Australia announced its new military alliance with Fiji, the first for the small island nation.
China responded with force, launching ballistic test missiles into the Pacific, which drew criticism from Australia and several of the Pacific Island countries.
Sakiasi Ditoka, Fiji’s foreign minister, urged all states to “exercise restraint”, while Matthew Wale, the new prime minister of the Solomon Islands, said that the launch was “not something a friend does”.
The missile test was a reminder of how close to home China’s threats can reach and where its ambitions could take it in the future.
“[China] has made clear it has quite malevolent intent towards Taiwan. There are those out there who say it’s only about Taiwan. It’s only about Taiwan now, but what about in 10 years’ time if they continue to grow and their aspirations and appetites continue to grow,” said Mr Blaxland.
“So it’s not just about today and tomorrow, and this is a long-term competitive influence.”
