SerpApi.Org
China now operates three aircraft carriers, and the third marks a clear break from the experimental phase of Beijing’s carrier program. Fujian entered service on Nov. 5, 2025, giving the People’s Liberation Army Navy its first flat-deck carrier equipped with electromagnetic catapults.
The Chinese Defense Ministry said Fujian began its first live-force maritime training shortly after commissioning. Chinese state media reported in April that the carrier was expected to move toward full operational capability during 2026, although building a mature air wing and carrier strike group will take longer than placing the ship in service.
The Pentagon’s 2025 report on China’s military assessed that the PLA Navy aims to produce six additional aircraft carriers by 2035, creating a total force of nine. The nine-carrier figure is a Pentagon assessment, not a procurement schedule publicly released by Beijing.
The United States still operates 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and retains major advantages in carrier aviation, logistics, training, and global experience. China’s growth creates a regional problem because Beijing can concentrate a larger share of its fleet in the western Pacific while the U.S. Navy divides its carriers among global commitments, maintenance periods, and training cycles.
Fujian Anchors China’s Larger Aircraft Carrier Fleet
China’s first carrier, Liaoning, entered service in 2012 after the unfinished Soviet hull was rebuilt. Shandong followed in 2019 as China’s first domestically built carrier. Fujian added catapult operations, a larger flight deck, and the ability to launch heavier aircraft than the ski-jump designs that preceded it. The progression from three different designs shows how quickly China has moved from learning basic carrier operations toward building a larger naval aviation force.
The Pentagon expects Fujian’s future air wing to include J-35 stealth fighters, J-15T fighters, J-15D electronic-warfare aircraft, KJ-600 airborne early-warning aircraft, helicopters, and unmanned systems. That mix would give China a carrier air wing with more surveillance, electronic warfare, and command-and-control capacity than Liaoning or Shandong can support.
Fujian still has to prove that capability at scale. A carrier becomes militarily useful through trained pilots, deck crews, maintenance teams, escorts, supply ships, and repeated operations under difficult conditions. China’s nine-carrier trajectory also depends on developing those people and procedures, not only launching additional hulls.
China’s Shipbuilding Base Supports the Carrier Program
China’s carrier ambitions rest on an industrial base much larger than the carrier program itself. CSIS found that Chinese yards produced more than half of global commercial shipbuilding output in 2024 and that many major yards serve both civilian and naval customers. Jiangnan Shipyard, which built Fujian, also constructs commercial vessels and advanced surface combatants.
Commercial shipbuilding capacity does not transfer automatically into aircraft-carrier production. Carriers require specialized design work, aviation systems, propulsion, weapons integration, and a workforce able to meet military standards. China still benefits from a vast shipbuilding advantage, including large yards, deep supplier networks, experienced welders and engineers, and sustained demand across commercial and military production.
Beijing has not confirmed the size or propulsion system of its fourth carrier. A Chinese naval promotional video released in April appeared to hint at another carrier, and analysts interpreted part of it as a possible reference to nuclear propulsion. Reuters described the video as a signal rather than proof of a completed design or construction milestone.
Nine Chinese Aircraft Carriers Would Change the Western Pacific
A nine-carrier fleet would remain smaller and less experienced than the U.S. force. The operational effect would come from availability and concentration. China could rotate carriers through maintenance and training while keeping more than one group available for exercises, patrols, or crisis operations near Taiwan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea.
Geography strengthens that force. Chinese carriers operating near the mainland can receive support from land-based aircraft, missiles, surveillance systems, ports, and repair facilities. American carrier groups must cross long distances, sustain logistics at sea, and operate while accounting for Chinese long-range strike systems. A direct comparison between Fujian and USS Gerald R. Ford therefore captures only part of the balance.
China began testing multi-carrier operations before Fujian entered service. Liaoning and Shandong conducted their first dual-carrier formation exercise in 2024. More carriers would allow the PLA Navy to expand those exercises and develop commanders who understand how to coordinate several flight decks, escorts, and support ships.
The U.S. Navy Has a Carrier Production and Availability Problem
The American advantage remains substantial, but replacing the current force is slow. The Congressional Budget Office said Nimitz-class carriers took seven to eight years to build, while Ford-class carriers are taking 10 to 11 years on current schedules. The United States also depends on one yard, Newport News Shipbuilding, for nuclear-powered carrier construction.
The Ford class is larger, nuclear-powered, and supported by a mature air wing and global logistics system. Those strengths will not disappear because China adds more hulls. Maintenance, training, and worldwide deployments prevent all 11 U.S. carriers from being available in the Pacific at once. Current construction delays have already produced a widening gap between carrier plans and delivery schedules.
Carrier air-wing range adds another constraint. China can combine its fleet with land-based missiles and aircraft designed to push U.S. forces farther from the mainland. The U.S. Navy must keep its carriers survivable while ensuring their aircraft can still reach assigned operating areas. That creates a more demanding planning problem than matching carrier totals.
China Can Change the Balance Without Matching USS Ford
China’s carriers will require destroyers, frigates, submarines, replenishment ships, aircraft, and trained crews. Beijing has been expanding those supporting forces along with the carriers. The escort fleet behind China’s three flight decks may matter as much as the carriers because a sustained blue-water force needs air defense, anti-submarine warfare, logistics, and command ships.
The 2035 projection could slip. Carrier construction is expensive, nuclear propulsion would introduce new risks, and China has less experience operating large carrier formations than the United States. Fujian’s progress during 2026 will show how quickly the PLA Navy can turn advanced equipment into dependable operations.
China has moved from one rebuilt Soviet carrier in 2012 to three commissioned ships, a catapult-equipped air wing in development, and a Pentagon estimate of nine carriers by 2035. Even if China falls short of that number, a force of five or six regularly operating carriers would make the western Pacific harder for the United States and its allies to manage.
By 2035, the United States may still possess the stronger carrier fleet. China’s buildup could leave Beijing with enough flight decks, escorts, aircraft, and regional support to maintain carrier presence near the main points of U.S.-China competition. That would change the number of Chinese carrier groups American commanders have to track and the forces Washington must keep available in the Pacific.
About the Author: Harry J. Kazianis
Harry J. Kazianis (@Grecianformula) was the former Senior Director of National Security Affairs at the Center for the National Interest (CFTNI), a foreign policy think tank founded by Richard Nixon based in Washington, DC. Harry has over a decade of experience in think tanks and national security publishing. His ideas have been published in the NY Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, CNN, and many other outlets worldwide. He has held positions at CSIS, the Heritage Foundation, the University of Nottingham, and several other institutions related to national security research and studies. He is the former Executive Editor of the National Interest and the Diplomat. He holds a Master’s degree focusing on international affairs from Harvard University.
